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Standing to Sue Beyond Individual Rights: Who Should Be Eligible to Bring 
Environmental Public Interest Litigation in China? 
Qi Gao* and Sean Whittaker** 
Abstracts: Formally adopted in 2012, environmental public interest litigation in China 
has expanded standing beyond individual rights, granting administrative authorities, 
procuratorates and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) the ability to initiate 
environmental public interest litigation. However, the aims of enhancing the 
enforcement of environmental regulation and the development of the ‘objective legality’ 
model through civil society have not been met. This is due to administrative authorities 
and procuratorates being granted standing, which inhibits NGOs from initiating their 
own public interest litigation in line with the aims of the ‘objective legality’ model. In 
order to promote participation by civil society and its actors in environmental law 
enforcement, NGOs should be granted preferential standing in environmental public 
interest litigation. To this end, the current requirements for NGOs to be granted standing 
should be relaxed, and the standing granted to administrative authorities and 
procuratorates should be limited or removed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
As a jurisdiction with a distinct political and legal system that is facing severe 
environmental challenges, China occupies a unique place in the global discussion on 
public interest litigation. Responding to environmental degradation in both urban1 and 
rural2 areas, China has formally recognized and implemented procedures that enable 
public interest litigation in environmental matters. In contrast with traditional rights-
based claims,3 public interest litigation is argued to result in ‘objective and impartial 
lawsuits’ which lead to improvements in how environmental laws are enforced.4 The 
implementation of this type of litigation in China is considered as a major legal 
breakthrough towards promoting civil society participation and enhancing the 
enforcement of environmental law. Inspired by the ‘private attorney general’ theory 
identified in the United States (US),5 these reforms open the door for China’s judicial 
system to directly address public interest issues. In turn, this enables China’s judiciary 
1 Hong Kong Free Press, Beijing starts 2017 Under a Cloud of Thick Toxic Smog,1 Jan. 2017. Available at: 
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/01/01/beijing-starts-2017-cloud-thick-toxic-smog/. 
2 Guangwei He, ‘China’s Dirty Pollution Secret: The Boom Poisoned Its Soils and Crops’, 30 June 2014. 
Available at: 
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/chinas_dirty_pollution_secret_the_boom_poisoned_its_soil_and_crops/2782/. 
3 C. Schall, ‘Public Interest Litigation Concerning Environmental Matters Before Human Rights Courts: A 
Promising Future Concept’ (2008) 20(3) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 417-53, at 419. 
4 Ibid., p. 444. 
5 J. A. Rabkin, ‘The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General’ (1998) 61(1) Law and Contemporary Problems, 
pp. 179-203. 
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to contribute to sustainable development and trigger a court-centred environmental 
movement in China. 
 
This innovative reform can be analyzed from many perspectives. In light of the 
fundamental difference between the parties initiating public interest litigation and 
traditional rights-based litigation, this article focuses on which parties have been 
granted standing to sue in environmental public interest litigation. Determining whether 
standing has been conferred on those who would seek to protect the public interest is 
of vital importance, because if it has not then the public interest in protecting the 
environment is unlikely to be vindicated. To this end, this article explores the relaxation 
of traditional standing rules in China, drawing on comparative experiences in Germany 
and the US. Section 2 reviews the evolution of standing requirements for environmental 
public interest litigation and examines the doctrinal and pragmatic rationale underlying 
the shift towards more liberal standing rules. It also provides a general picture of 
relevant legal documents and disputes. This is followed by a detailed analysis in 
Sections 3 to 5 of the standing of administrative authorities, procuratorates6 and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). The article discusses the issues surrounding how 
standing has been granted to these bodies and organizations and highlights the inherent 
overreach of granting standing to administrative authorities and procuratorates at the 
expense of NGOs. Conclusions and recommendations are provided in Section 6. 
                                                 
6 A somewhat analogous term for procuratorates is public prosecutors. However, there are some distinctions 
between the two, so this article will refer to these bodies as procuratorates. See Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China, art.129 and G. Ginsburgs & A. Stahnke, ‘The Genesis of the People's Procuratorate in 
Communist China 1949-1951’ (1964) 20 The China Quarterly, pp. 1-37, at 1. 
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 2. THE RELAXATION OF TRADITIONAL STANDING RULES: FROM THE 
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO OBJECTIVE LEGALITY 
2.1. The Rise of Objective Legality 
Within the area of environmental litigation, there is a tension between the focus on the 
rights of the plaintiff in determining standing and the broader public interest in the 
quality of the environment. 7  Traditionally, plaintiffs had to show that their own 
individual interests had been negatively affected by the action (or inaction) that was 
impacting the environment. 8  Without such a connection, plaintiffs would be 
unsuccessful in initiating judicial actions. 9  This rights-based approach has been 
justified on the basis that political processes, rather than the courts, were better suited 
to defending the public interest in the environment. 10  In this way, the focus on 
individual rights was used to justify the restriction of public interest litigation.11  
 
However, this focus on individual rights has been criticized for being unable to provide 
enough protection for environmental values that exceed the boundaries of individual 
rights. 12  Critics note that since environmental interests are underrepresented in 
regulatory and political processes, judicial intervention should act to counterbalance the 
                                                 
7 H. P. Henry, ‘A Shift in Citizen Suit Standing Doctrine: Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services’ (2001) 28(2) Ecology Law Quarterly, pp. 233-52, at 234. See also Walton v The Scottish Ministers [2012] 
UKSC 44, para 152. 
8 M. S. Greve, ‘The Non-Reformation of Administrative Law: Standing to Sue and Public Interest Litigation in 
West German Environmental Law’ (1989) 2 Cornell International Law Journal, pp. 197-244. 
9 Ibid., p. 201; Rabkin, n. 5 above, p. 183 and Hudson, n. 7 above, p. 235. 
10 Ibid., p. 213. 
11 Ibid., at 232. 
12 Particularly with regard to nature conservation: see E. Rehbinder, ‘Collective Court Actions for Protecting the 
Environment in the EU and Germany’. Speech delivered at the Counsellors’ Office of the Shanghai Municipal 
People’s Government, 30 Oct. 2014. 
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powerful interests that favour industrial development over environmental protection.13 
It is within this context that a move from ‘formalistic and individualistic justiciability 
doctrines’ of legal standing towards an ‘objective legality’ model is justified as a 
‘natural adaptation of the legal system to more complex technologies and social 
realities’.14 
  
This development towards the ‘objective legality’ model is significant because it lies in 
stark contrast to the focus on the rights of the individual. Under the ‘objective legality’ 
model, the legal power of the state is not restricted by the need to observe the rights of 
others but instead by the norms established by the law itself.15 Consequently, under the 
‘objective legality’ model the rules establishing standing have to be relaxed in order to 
accommodate this enhanced focus on legal norms.16 This is significant in the context 
of environmental law, as the norms that are created focus on enhancing and improving 
the quality of the natural environment.  
 
The ‘objective legality’ model has numerous advantages when compared to the model 
focusing on the private enforcement of individual rights. Underpinning the ‘individual 
rights’ model is the assumption that individuals will initiate litigation to protect their 
rights. This however does not account for countervailing considerations, such as the 
                                                 
13 R. E. Levy & R. L. Glicksman, ‘Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court’s Environmental Law 
Decisions’ (1989) 42 Vanderbilt Law Review, pp. 343-430, at 346. 
14 Greve, n. 8 above, p. 223. 
15 A. Yakovlev & M. Berman, Striving for Law in a Lawless Land: Memoirs of a Russian Reformer (Routledge, 
1995), p. 22. 
16 Greve, n. 8 above, p. 220; Degenhart, Kernenergierecht: Schwerpunkte, Entscheidungsstrukturen, 
Entwicklungslinien, pp. 154-55 (1981). 
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expense of litigation, which can have a dissuasive impact on a person’s willingness to 
enforce their individual rights. These competing interests can be particularly impactful 
in environmental cases, where the damage inflicted on each individual affected by 
environmental harm may be small but the total damage inflicted on the environment is 
substantial.17 By expanding the rules of standing to encapsulate those willing to litigate 
for the public interest, the ‘objective legality’ model enables them to hold those 
responsible to account. Further, the increased ability to initiate environmental litigation 
addresses gaps in the state’s ability (or willingness) to enforce regulatory laws18 and 
acts to supplement the public enforcement of environmental law. 19  In this way, 
increasing the ability of the public to act as environmental protectors through judicial 
proceedings has had a positive effect on how the interests of the environment are 
protected.20 
 
This movement towards the ‘objective legality’ model can be identified in both the US 
and Germany. In the US the shift towards the ‘objective legality’ model occurred during 
the ‘environmental decade’ of the 1970s, epitomized by the judicial expansion of 
standing in Sierra Club v. Morton.21 However, while there has been a shift towards the 
‘objective legality’ model, the foundation of the US legal system is still rights-based. 
                                                 
17 S. Shavell, ‘Liability for Harm versus Regulation for Safety’ (1984) 13(2) The Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 
357-74, at 372-4. 
18 B. Boyer & E. Meidinger, ‘Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits 
under Federal Environmental Laws’ (1985) 34 Buffalo Law Review, pp. 834-964, at 836-7. 
19 Ibid., p. 838 and Rabkin, n. 5 above, p. 179. Notwithstanding this, the enforcement of environmental law is 
mainly conducted through administrative action initiated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
judicial action brought by the Department of Justice on behalf of the US (cases are referred by the EPA). 
20 J. C. Coffee, Jr., ‘Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private 
Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions’ (1986) 86(4) Columbia Law Review, pp. 669-727, at 
669. 
21 Sierra Club v. Morton (1972), 405 U. S. 727, pp.738, 753. 
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Although the US Supreme Court has expanded the categories of injury which can 
establish standing,22 the basis for these categories (and, thus, for standing in public 
interest litigation) is still rooted in the concepts of individual rights and the rights-based 
model.23  
 
In Germany, the move towards adopting the ‘objective legality’ model can be evidenced 
through the recognition of association suits. While many states in Germany had 
recognized association suits in the field of nature conservation during the 1980s,24 
these types of suits were only recognized at the federal level in 2002.25 While the 
movement towards the ‘objective legality’ model occurred later in Germany than in the 
US, there are clear parallels between the jurisdictions. However, they are not identical. 
Due to underlying differences between the US and German legal systems, German law 
imposes much stricter threshold requirements on plaintiffs than American law. While 
both individuals and organizations are allowed to bring citizen suit in the US, Germany 
only grants standing to certain recognized environmental organizations. 26  This is 
significant, as it indicates that the path towards adopting the ‘objective legality’ model 
is not uniform, and that different jurisdictions are likely to follow different paths in 
incorporating the model into their own legal systems. 
                                                 
22 See Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. (2000), 528 U.S. 167. See also 
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (2007), 549 U.S. 497.  
23 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992), 504 U.S. 555, 560. 
24 Rehbinder, n. 12 above.  
25 §63 BNatSchG. 
26 NGOs that fulfil prerequisites stipulated by the Environmental Remedies Act should gain recognition from 
competent federal or state (provincial) environmental authorities. For a list of recognized NGOs, see German 
Environment Agency (UBA), Recognition of Environmental and Nature Protection Associations (12 Apr. 2016). 
Available at: http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/en/recognition-of-environmental-nature-protection. 
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 It is within this context that China’s shift towards the ‘objective legality’ model can be 
analyzed. Indeed, China is potentially uniquely suited to adopting the ‘objective legality’ 
model due to the fundamental elements of its political ideology. Under China’s socialist 
ideology, the public interest is considered as the highest good, and individuals are 
encouraged to sacrifice their personal gains and suppress their personal needs to further 
public goals.27 Although this emphasis on the public interest has evolved since China’s 
decentralization measures in the 1980s, it continues to dominate China’s political and 
legal culture.  
 
Within contemporary China, the public interest as it relates to environmental matters is 
personified by the Chinese government’s policy of ‘building an ecological 
civilization’.28 A vital element of this policy is the positive view of public interest 
litigation as an important element of public participation,29 which has empowered 
courts to hear environmental cases despite the control exerted by the Chinese 
government. 30  This approval of public interest litigation is significant in holding 
Chinese public authorities to account, as the lack of judicial independence in China31 
                                                 
27 See Z. Liang & W. Liang, Collectivism of Mao Zedong and Its Practical Significance (9 Jan. 2018). Available 
at: https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/mzdsxyj_568/201801/t20180116_236466.htm, CCCPC Party Literature Research 
Office (in Chinese). 
28 S. Geall, Interpreting Ecological Civilisation (Part One) (7 June 2015). Available at: 
https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/8018-Interpreting-ecological-civilisation-part-one-. 
29 Central Committee of the Communist Party of China & the State Council, Opinions on Accelerating the 
Ecological Civilization Construction (25 Apr. 2015). Available at: http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2015-
05/06/nw.D110000renmrb_20150506_3-01.htm (in Chinese). 
30 See generally W. Fairbairn, ‘An Examination of Judicial Independence in China’ (2016) 23(4) Journal of 
Financial Crime, pp. 819-832, at 819. 
31 The judicial branch in China falls short of independence from the executive branch in terms of budget allocation 
and personnel appointment. T. Yang, ‘The Success Rate of Administrative Actions Went Down Rather than Going 
Up’ China Youth News (Beijing), 6 Nov. 2014, p. 2 (in Chinese). 
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increases the difficulty of having such cases heard. This is not to suggest that rights-
based litigation has no role to play in enforcing China’s environmental regulations; as 
demonstrated in the US and Germany, private litigation can play a large role in 
enforcing environmental regulations. Rather, the ‘objective legality’ model enshrined 
in China’s current policy allows courts to play a bigger role in environmental law 
enforcement. However, the implementation of the ‘objective legality’ model does not 
necessarily complement the traditional rights-based method of determining standing. 
Care must be taken in determining which specific individuals or bodies can initiate 
environmental litigation which is truly in the public interest. Without due control, public 
interest litigation procedures could be used for personal gain, in turn undermining the 
public aims of the litigation process. Hence, the ‘objective legality’ model can only act 
to complement the traditional right-based model if the laws determining who can bring 
such litigation are carefully crafted.  
 
2.2.The Evolution of Standing Rules in Environmental Public Interest Litigation 
in China 
The current rules on standing in environmental cases in China are a result of both 
judicial interpretation and legislative enactment. Prior to the formal recognition of 
public interest litigation in 2012, the Chinese judiciary had relaxed the requirements for 
standing in a small number of cases for plaintiffs who claimed to represent the public 
interest.32 This was followed by China’s civil society advocating reforms to the rules 
                                                 
32 Examples include Local People’s Government of Lishu District, Jixi City v. Jixi Chemical Industry Bureau and 
Shenyang Smelting Plant (1995), People’s Procuratorate of Haizhu District, Guangzhou Municipality v. 
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governing standing,33 which led to the creation of the current legal framework for 
environmental public interest litigation in China. Among these reforms, two pieces of 
legislation are of particular relevance: the Civil Procedure Law (revised in 2012) which 
grants standing to ‘relevant organizations and authorities prescribed by law’ with the 
aim of enhancing environmental protection,34 and the Environmental Protection Law 
(revised in 2014), which set new threshold requirements for the standing of NGOs.35 
 
The legislative developments are not the sole instruments of reform for determining 
standing in environmental cases. The Supreme People’s Court has issued three quasi-
legislative documents 36  which altered the traditional rules regarding standing: the 
Judicial Interpretation on Environmental Public Interest Litigation (2015), the Judicial 
Interpretation on Civil Procedure Law (2015), and the Judicial Interpretation on Public 
Interest Litigation Cases Initiated by Procuratorates (2018). Further, following efforts 
of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Civil Procedure Law and Administrative 
Litigation Law were amended in June 2017. The revisions expanded standing in 
environmental cases to enable procuratorates to challenge the legitimacy of 
                                                 
Zhongming Chen et al. (2008 and Local People’s Government of Yexie Town, Songjiang District, Shanghai v. 
Rongxiang Jiang and Shengzhen Dong (2012). It should be noted that the plaintiffs in these cases are 
administrative authorities and procuratorates, and that the relaxation of standing in these cases are based on 
distorted doctrinal interpretations on national property rights and government powers. 
33 Xiaohong Yang, China’s Green NGOs Fight for the Right to Sue (2013). Avaialble at: 
https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/6560-China-s-s-green-NGOs-fight-for-the-right-to-sue/en. 
34 Civil Procedure Law, National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 27 June 2017 (in Chinese), art. 55(1). In 
2012, it was stipulated in Article 55. 
35 Another piece of notable legislation is the Marine Environmental Protection Law, Article 89 (previously Article 
90 until the revisions to the Law in 2016) of which has been considered as the statutory basis for public interest 
litigation initiated by administrative authorities since 1999. This is discussed in more detail in section three of this 
article.  
36 On the topic of judicial interpretations, see generally Chenguang Wang, ‘Law-making Functions of the Chinese 
Courts: Judicial Activism in a Country of Rapid Social Changes’ (2006) 3 Frontiers of Law in China, pp. 1-30. 
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administrative decisions in courts and bring public interest litigation for environmental 
purposes.  
 
In order to clarify the current standing requirements for environmental public interest 
litigation, the following table summarizes the state of play in China: 
 
Public Interest 
Litigation as a 
Civil Action 
Article 55(1) of the 
Civil Procedure 
Law (2017) grants 
standing to 
‘relevant 
organizations and 
authorities 
prescribed by law’ 
to bring lawsuits 
against 
environmental 
pollution activities 
 
Article 55(2) of the 
Civil Procedure 
Law (2017) grants 
NGOs: NGOs that fulfil the prerequisites 
stipulated by Article 58 of the 
Environmental Protection Law are allowed 
to bring public interest litigation against 
polluters (further interpreted by Articles 2-
5 of the Judicial Interpretation on 
Environmental Public Interest Litigation). 
Administrative Authorities: Article 89 of 
the Marine Environmental Protection Law 
authorizes administrative authorities in 
charge of marine environment protection to 
seek compensation from polluters on 
behalf of the State. 
Procuratorates: Article 55(2) of Civil 
Procedure Law allows procuratorates to 
initiate public interest litigation against 
11
standing to 
procuratorates as a 
complementary 
measure to promote 
public interest 
litigation 
 
polluters37 if no organizations or 
authorities stipulated in Article 55(1) exist 
or they refuse to file such cases. A 30-day 
pre-trial notification process is required by 
Article 13 of the Judicial Interpretation on 
Public Interest Litigation Cases Initiated 
by Procuratorates. 
Public Interest 
Litigation as 
an 
Administrative 
Action 
The amendment of 
the Administrative 
Litigation Law in 
2014 did not include 
any provision on 
public interest 
litigation against 
administrative 
authorities. This 
changed in 2017. 
Article 25(4) of the 
Law currently opens 
the door for 
Procuratorates: Article 25(4) of the 
Administrative Litigation Law allows 
procuratorates to initiate public interest 
litigation against administrative authorities 
in charge of environmental protection and 
natural resources preservation. 38  Pre-trial 
notice should be given to administrative 
authorities to urge them to comply with 
legal requirements. Only if they refuse to 
correct the alleged violation, can 
procuratorates initiate public interest 
litigation. 
                                                 
37 Procuratorates are also allowed to bring public interest litigation against private persons to protect consumer 
interests on the safety of food and pharmaceuticals. 
38 Procuratorates are also allowed to bring public interest litigation against administrative authorities in charge of 
the protection of state-owned properties, the transfer of right to use state-owned land and the safety of food and 
pharmaceuticals. 
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procuratorates to 
bring public interest 
litigation against 
administrative 
authorities. 
Figure 1 Standing Requirements for Environmental Public Interest Litigation in China 
 
3. STANDING OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Within China’s political structure, administrative authorities act as an executive branch 
of government, enforcing laws and implementing policy within China. While 
administrative authorities do not generally initiate judicial proceedings, they are 
explicitly granted standing under Article 89 of the Marine Environmental Protection 
Law (MEPL) where the public interest is jeopardized.39 The standing of administrative 
authorities is not limited to the MEPL however: judges have also granted administrative 
authorities standing under the Civil Procedure Law through somewhat controversial 
interpretations of individual rights, administrative powers and their relationship with 
the standing doctrine. 
 
Article 89 of the MEPL is generally viewed as a provision based on the ‘objective 
legality’ model of public interest litigation. However, a closer examination of the 
                                                 
39 It should be noted that while most environmental law academics consider it as a provision on public interest 
litigation, some civil procedure law academics consider otherwise on the basis that administrative authorities 
represent the state in protecting its property rights. 
13
statutory language in Article 89 suggests otherwise. It empowers administrative 
authorities to seek compensation on behalf of the state for damage to natural resources. 
This can be viewed alongside Article 9 of the Chinese Constitution, which confirms 
that these natural resources are mainly state-owned. Consequently, since administrative 
authorities in charge of protecting the marine environment are only allowed to litigate 
to protect the state’s private ownership rights, litigation brought under Article 89 is 
generally inconsistent with the ‘objective legality’ model of public interest litigation.40 
Similar issues can be identified in notices issued by the Supreme People’s Court41 and 
the Reform Plan for the Compensation of Environmental Damage42 promulgated by 
China’s State Council.43 
 
Although administrative authorities sue on the state’s behalf, current judicial practice 
considers them as the plaintiff, rather than the state. This can be problematic because 
environmental management in China often involves several administrative 
departments,44 all of which can sue on behalf of the state under Article 89. As the 
current position on the distribution and management of economic compensation derived 
from public interest litigation is unclear, bureaucratic infighting is likely to occur. 
                                                 
40 A public legal person can participate in civil procedures if its civil rights or interests were harmed. See Cui 
Zhou, ‘The Function and Procedure of the Civil Public Interest Litigation’ (2014) 5 Northern Legal Science, pp. 
90-104 (in Chinese). 
41 See Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing Several Opinions on Providing Judicial Safeguard and 
Services for Accelerating the Transformation of Economic Development Mode, No. [2010]18, 29 June 2010 (in 
Chinese), where the Supreme People’s Court urged local courts to accept environmental cases filed by 
environmental protection authorities on behalf of the State seeking compensation of damages. 
42 See State Council, Reform Plan for the Compensation of Environmental Damages (17 Dec. 2017). Available at: 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2017-12/17/content_5247952.htm (in Chinese), which authorizes provincial and 
municipal governments to bring lawsuits to seek compensation for environmental damages within their 
administrative jurisdictions. 
43 The State Council is China’s chief administrative authority. 
44 For example, in the case of marine environmental protection the main responsibilities are distributed among the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection, the State Oceanic Administration, and the Ministry of Agriculture. 
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Further, administrative agencies initiating environmental litigation are wrongly 
considered to be the equivalent of a distinct legal person when they are, in fact, an 
emanation of the state.45 Therefore, the current design of the procedures under both 
Article 89 of the MEPL and the reforms initiated by the State Council undermine the 
core tenets of the ‘objective legality’ model.46 
 
Another justification for granting administrative authorities standing is derived from 
their administrative responsibilities for the environment or natural resources. In 
Environmental Protection Bureau of Jiangyin v. Wenfeng Wang et al. (2013), the 
plaintiff’s standing was recognized by the court on the basis of its administrative power 
to protect the natural environment within its jurisdiction.47 This case was selected by 
the Supreme People’s Court as one of nine typical environmental cases in China48 that 
courts in China should refer to when adjudicating on similar cases. The selection of this 
case as ‘typical’ is problematic because, contrary to the legal reasoning underpinning 
the case, exercising administrative powers does not necessarily provide standing to sue 
in Chinese civil procedures. This gap in the court’s legal reasoning highlights the strain 
that is being placed on the judicial system in recognizing the standing of administrative 
authorities in environmental litigation. A potential solution to this issue would be to 
                                                 
45 See Zhou, n. 40 above, p. 95. 
46 See also Local People’s Government of Lishu District, Jixi City v. Jixi Chemical Industry Bureau and Shenyang 
Smelting Plant (1995) and Local People’s Government of Yexie Town, Songjiang District, Shanghai v. Rongxiang 
Jiang and Shengzhen Dong (2012), which are examples of the Chinese judiciary relaxing the requirements for 
standing in a variety of cases for plaintiffs who claimed to represent the public interest.   
47 See also Environmental Protection Bureau of Jiangyin v. Wenfeng Wang et al., Basic Court of Jiangyin, Civil 
Division, First Instance, No.3, 4 December 2013 (in Chinese) and Local People’s Government of Yexie Town, 
Songjiang District, Shanghai v. Rongxiang Jiang and Shengzhen Dong, Basic Court of Songjiang, Civil Division, 
First Instance, No.4022, 28 June 2012 (in Chinese). 
48 The Supreme People’s Court Announces Nine Typical Environmental Cases (3 July 2014). Available at: 
http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/07/id/1329697.shtml (in Chinese).  
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reform the current statutory framework to explicitly grant standing to administrative 
authorities in environmental litigation of this nature.  
 
However, it is questionable whether the move towards relaxing standing requirements 
for administrative authorities in environmental litigation is well-conceived. One critical 
point to highlight is that, to a large extent, administrative authorities are already 
equipped with a variety of administrative powers to enforce environmental law. 49 
Scholars such as Wang have noted that the primary reasons for the ineffective 
enforcement of laws by administrative authorities are abuse of administrative power, 
rent seeking and ‘power-for-money’ deals. 50  Providing an additional enforcement 
mechanism for administrative authorities does not resolve these underlying issues. 
Instead, increased supervision and transparency of administrative authorities in their 
use of pre-existing enforcement mechanisms would be more suitable to improve the 
enforcement of environmental regulations. 
 
Furthermore, while administrative authorities are obliged to fulfil their executive 
responsibilities they are not obliged to initiate litigation where the public interest in the 
environment is being harmed. To some extent, this can be viewed as positive as it allows 
the authority to explore other, less expensive and confrontational, remedial options. 
                                                 
49 Indeed, following the responsibilities of administrative authorities to enforce environmental law, most 
provisions of the Environmental Protection Law (2014) are devoted to enumerating the powers and obligations of 
the executive branch on environmental protection. See generally J. Wang, Environmental Law (Peking University 
Press, 2015), pp. 79-88 (in Chinese); Environmental Protection Law, National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee, Order No. 9, 24 Apr. 2014 (in Chinese). 
50 See X. Wang, ‘The Legislative Priority of Environmental Public Interest Litigation’ (2016) 10(6) Tsinghua 
University Law Journal, pp. 101-14, at 107 (in Chinese). 
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However, it is not clear how administrative authorities determine whether to initiate 
public interest litigation or not. This lack of transparency prevents administrative 
authorities from being accountable for how they exercise their powers, and provides the 
state with opportunities to manipulate litigation efforts under the banner of 
environmental protection. 
 
Perhaps more critically, the state did not factor in the negative impact that granting 
standing to administrative authorities would have on the ability of NGOs to initiate 
legal proceedings. Indeed, in practice the fact that administrative authorities have been 
granted standing by the MEPL has been used to justify limitations to NGOs’ standing. 
This is particularly prevalent in cases relating to the marine environment, where courts 
have held that, because administrative authorities have been explicitly granted standing 
under the MEPL, NGOs do not have standing under the more general provisions of the 
Environmental Protection Law.51  However, decisions based on perceived conflicts 
between the MEPL and the Environmental Protection Law are flawed because this 
conflict is illusory. Unlike the Environmental Protection Law, Article 89 MEPL should 
not be considered as public interest litigation since, as previously discussed, it does not 
fit the ‘objective legality’ model. Further, it must be noted that Article 89 MEPL does 
not exclude NGOs from having standing in matters relating to the marine environment: 
both administrative authorities and NGOs can validly have standing under Article 55(1) 
of the Civil Procedure Law. 
                                                 
51 Dalian Environmental Protection Volunteers Association v. PetroChina Fuel Oil Co., Ltd. et al., Dalian 
Maritime Court, Registration Division, First Instance, No. 5, 17 June 2015 (in Chinese). 
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 This analysis considers the challenges that arise when administrative authorities are 
granted standing to initiate environmental public interest litigation. It also raises one 
significant question: should China have granted standing to administrative authorities? 
In exploring this question, it is valuable to look towards Germany and how it deals with 
the matter in the context of its public authorities. In Germany, public authorities are not 
granted standing in association suits because such suits focus on the administrative acts 
and omissions of the public authorities tasked with enforcing environmental law and 
protecting the environment.52 Hence, association suits in Germany are not intended to 
empower public authorities to act as environmental watchdogs. On the contrary, they 
are considered as an important form of civil society participation and a tool for the 
public to exercise its right of access to justice.53 
 
By not granting standing to public authorities in association suits, Germany avoids the 
difficulties that China has encountered in granting standing to administrative authorities. 
While some of these issues arise as a result of failings within the statutory framework, 
addressing statutory failings does not fully integrate administrative authorities into the 
‘objective legality’ model of public interest litigation. Indeed, administrative authorities 
crowd out NGOs, whose litigation efforts truly embody the ‘objective legality’ model. 
In this way, in order to improve environmental law enforcement in China the legislature 
                                                 
52 § 8 V UWG; § 1 I UKlaG; German Environment Agency (UBA), Access to Justice (3 February 2006). Available 
at: http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/en/access-to-justice. 
53 Rehbinder, n. 12 above. 
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should place administrative powers under tighter supervision instead of expanding 
administrative power through granting administrative authorities standing in 
environmental litigation. This focus on the supervision of administrative powers is 
reflected in the second group of bodies which have been granted standing to initiate 
environmental public interest litigation in China: procuratorates.  
 
4. STANDING OF PROCURATORATES 
In China, the People’s Procuratorates are constitutionally recognized as the state organs 
responsible for criminal prosecutions and ‘legal supervision’.54 Nevertheless, before 
2015 the rules regarding standing of procuratorates to initiate environmental litigation 
were nebulous. While courts had granted standing to procuratorates on the basis of their 
duty to protect state-owned properties and resources from illegal activities,55  this 
interpretation contradicted the narrow remit of their ‘legal supervision’ duties.56 As a 
result of the uncertainty surrounding the standing of procuratorates, the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate has advocated granting standing to procuratorates in public 
interest litigation since 2000. However, it was not until the revision of the 
Environmental Protection Law in 2014 that China began to act on these proposals. This 
was then followed by a pilot practice granting a limited number of procuratorates 
standing in environmental litigation in 2015.57 
                                                 
54 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China [1982], art. 129. 
55 People’s Procuratorate of Haizhu District, Guangzhou Municipality v. Zhongming Chen et al., Maritime Court 
of Guangzhou, First Instance, No.382, 9 December 2008 (in Chinese). 
56 See further Article 5 of the Law on the Organization of People’s Procuratorate. 
57 Supreme People’s Procuratorate, National People’s Congress Standing Committee Authorized Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate to Initiate Pilot Practice on Public Interest Litigation (1 July 2015). Available at: 
http://www.spp.gov.cn/xwfbh/wsfbt/201507/t20150701_100535.shtml (in Chinese) and Implementation Measures 
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 By December 2016, 94 environmental public interest litigation cases had been initiated 
by procuratorates in pilot areas.58 Among them, 25 cases were against private persons 
and 68 cases were filed against administrative authorities.59 Viewing this pilot scheme 
as a success, China granted standing to additional procuratorates under the Civil 
Procedure Law 2017 and the Administrative Litigation Law 2017. Granting standing to 
procuratorates in this way is novel in the global context: German public prosecutors 
have gradually withdrawn from involvement in civil procedures60 and, while the US 
Department of Justice has similar enforcement powers, its role is more that of a 
litigation counsel rather than a plaintiff. As such, given the uniqueness of the Chinese 
situation the potential environmental benefits of public interest litigation by 
procuratorates merit further exploration. 
 
While both the Civil Procedure Law and the Administrative Litigation Law give 
procuratorates standing to initiate environmental public interest litigation, they differ in 
various substantive ways. Under the Civil Procedure Law, procuratorates may initiate 
public interest litigation against polluters only if no other organizations or authorities 
mentioned in Article 55(1) of the Law exist, or if these organizations refuse to initiate 
public interest litigation.61 In order to identify whether organizations identified under 
                                                 
for Pilots on People’s Procuratorates Initiating Public Interest Litigation, Procuratorial Committee of the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate, 16 December 2015. 
58 Zhongmin Zhang, ‘Observation Report on Environmental Public Interest Litigation Filed by Procuratorates in 
Piloting Areas’. Speech delivered at Symposium on the Theory and Practice of Environmental Public Interest 
Litigation in China, Zhejiang University, 10 June 2017, in Chinese. 
59 One case is administrative litigation with incidental civil action. 
60 O. Jauernig [Cui Zhou trans], Civil Procedure Law (Law Press, 2003), p. 77 (in Chinese). 
61 Civil Procedure Law, National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 27 June 2017 (in Chinese), art. 55(2). 
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Article 55(1) intend to initiate environmental litigation, the procuratorate must go 
through a 30-day pre-trial notification procedure. 62  This gives the organizations 
concerned a period of time to initiate legal action themselves, or to express their 
willingness to support the procuratorate as plaintiffs. The notification requirement is 
significant, as it indicates that procuratorates are not intended to replace or overshadow 
environmental NGOs in enforcing environmental legislation. 
 
In contrast to the Civil Procedure Law, the Administrative Litigation Law allows 
procuratorates a wider power to initiate public interest litigation against administrative 
authorities in charge of environmental protection and natural resources preservation.63 
While standing is only granted to initiate environmental litigation against 
administrative authorities under a particular set of circumstances, procuratorates do not 
need to consider whether any other relevant organizations are interested in initiating 
public interest litigation. Instead, procuratorates must submit a pre-trial prosecutorial 
notice to the administrative authority, urging it to comply with its legal duties. In this 
way, the Administrative Litigation Law simply does not engage with the issue of 
environmental NGO or civil society litigation nor represent the ‘objective legality’ 
model.  
 
                                                 
62 Judicial Interpretation on Public Interest Litigation Cases Initiated by Procuratorates 2018, art. 13. 
63 Administrative Litigation Law, National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 27 June 2017 (in Chinese), 
art.25(4).  
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Regardless of the differences between the Civil Procedure Law and the Administrative 
Litigation Law, they both marginalize the role of NGOs in environmental public interest 
litigation by granting standing to procuratorates. This can be evidenced by the 
substantial gap between the number of environmental public interest cases brought be 
procuratorates and NGOs.64 Moreover, although 700 NGOs claim to have standing in 
environmental public interest litigation,65 only 25 of them have actually filed such 
lawsuits in court for the past three years.66 
 
One reason for the marginalization of NGOs in environmental public interest legislation 
is that procuratorates can undermine the pre-trial procedures enshrined in the Civil 
Procedure Law. The pre-trial procedure is intended to grant NGOs the opportunity to 
initiate their own public interest litigation, but it also introduces additional legal 
obstacles and allows procuratorates to place political pressure on NGOs.67 Critically, 
procuratorates too are vulnerable to political pressure: they are incentivized to initiate 
enforcement actions in the public interest in order to increase their rate of successful 
prosecutions.68 This has the perverse consequence of the pre-trial procedure being used 
                                                 
64 Between 2013 and 2017, procuratorates brought 1383 environmental public interest litigation cases, while 
NGOs only initiated 252 cases. Supreme People’s Court Work Report (9 Mar. 2008). Available at: 
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-87832.html (in Chinese). 
65 S. Xing & Y. Jin, According to the Supreme People’s Court, More than 700 NGOs Have Standing in 
Environmental Public Interest Litigation (7 Jan. 2015). Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-
01/07/c_127364386.htm (in Chinese). 
66 H. Chen, Rethink the Nationalization of Public Interest Litigation (29 Aug. 2018). Available at 
http://news.cssn.cn/zx/bwyc/201808/t20180829_4550532.shtml (in Chinese). 
67 F. Ge, ‘A Practical Perspective on Environmental Public Interest Litigation’. Speech delivered at Environmental 
and Resources Law Institute, 3 June 2017. 
68 Zhang, n. 58 above. 
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by procurtatorates to dissuade NGOs from initiating public interest litigation in order 
to inflate their own prosecution rate.69 
 
In addition, once procuratorates do initiate environmental public interest litigation, 
NGOs become unable to initiate their own litigation due to the legal principle of res 
judicata.70  Further barriers arise because of the nature of civil procedures, which 
usually entail substantial litigation costs.71 These are substantial obstacles for NGOs in 
China, as civil society within China has not had the opportunity to develop experience 
or gather economic and human resources.72  Consequently, when compared to the 
resources and powers available to procuratorates, NGOs will often be portrayed as less 
able to protect the public interest. As a result, procuratorates are encouraged to initiate 
their own public interest proceedings,73 overshadowing the role of NGOs and further 
inhibiting the growth of a Chinese civil society.74  
 
While the marginalization of NGOs in China does undermine their role in the 
enforcement of environmental regulations, some academics have argued that this is a 
                                                 
69 J. Cui, Case Accepted: The Procuratorate of Nanjing Brought Public Interest Litigation against the Release of 
Acid Waste into Yangtze River (4 Jan. 2017). Available at: http://www.chinanews.com/m/sh/2017/01-
04/8113682.shtml (in Chinese). 
70 Judicial Interpretation on Environmental Public Interest Litigation, No. 1 [2015] of the Supreme People’s Court, 
art. 28 (in Chinese). 
71 J. Ke, Theory of Practical Reason in Environmental Law (Chinese Social Science Press, 2012), p. 4 (in 
Chinese). 
72 Q. Gao, A Procedural Framework for Transboundary Water Management in the Mekong River Basin: Shared 
Mekong for a Common Future (Brill, 2014), p. 189. 
73 See H. Chen, Rethink the Nationalization of Public Interest Litigation (29 Aug. 2018). Available at 
http://news.cssn.cn/zx/bwyc/201808/t20180829_4550532.shtml (in Chinese). 
74 Similar issues can be identified in other states with developing civil societies, such as Brazil. See L. K. 
Mcallister, Making Law Matter: Environmental Protection and Legal Institutions in Brazil (Stanford University 
Press, 2008), p. 69. 
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positive development.75  This argument rests on the political and legal strength of 
procuratorates and their ability to enforce domestic environmental regulations. 
However, it ignores various fundamental problems when procuratorates take over the 
role of NGOs and civil society. Firstly, procuratorates in China have not yet gained 
independence from the executive branch. This is a significant problem, as 
administrative intervention or influence from the executive branch is almost 
unavoidable. Under such circumstances, it is reasonable to worry that the standing of 
procuratorates in civil proceedings could be manipulated as a new tool to invade 
individual rights or overlook particular instances of environmental damage. This 
contrasts with the independent status of NGOs, who are not subject to executive 
influence and can take independent strategic decisions about when and how to hold the 
state to account. 
 
A second, connected issue is that the ability of procuratorates to initiate environmental 
public interest litigation is not a ‘power’ that can be supervised under public law. 
Consequently, procuratorates cannot be held to account for their decision whether or 
not to initiate judicial proceedings in the public interest. This is problematic, as without 
accountability it is difficult to determine whether the decisions of the procuratorates 
truly serve the public interest in protecting the environment. A further exacerbating 
factor here is that the binding effect of illegal administrative actions cannot be 
challenged via civil public interest litigation. This is because Chinese courts are not 
                                                 
75 Chen, n. 73 above. 
24
competent to review the legality of administrative decisions through civil procedures. 
Consequently, administrative omissions can be ‘covered up’ by blaming polluters.76  
 
A final consideration is that, even when a procuratorate is successful in its public 
interest litigation case, enforcement of the judgment still relies on the administration. 
For example, in the Procuratorate of Xishan District, Wuxi City v. Huarong Li et al. 
(2009), the court ordered the responsible administrative authority to oversee the 
defendants’ remedial efforts to restore the environment to its original state.77 This adds 
further complexity to the relationship between procuratorates and administrative 
authorities: because procuratorates may need to rely on administrative authorities to 
enforce the judgments of the court, they may become less willing to hold them to 
account in other instances. As a result, there is a risk that procuratorates will focus their 
public interest litigation efforts on private individuals and overlook environmental 
damages caused by administrative authorities.78 This risk is enhanced by the ‘judicial 
supervision’ powers of the procuratorates, 79  which enables them to call for the 
reconsideration of their own cases. As a result, increased standing of procuratorates 
may lead to greater environmental governance problems in China,80 to the detriment 
of the environment.  
 
                                                 
76 Rehbinder, n. 12 above.  
77 The Procuratorate of Xishan District, Wuxi City v. Huarong Li et al., Basic Court of Xishan, Civil Division, 
First Instance, No. 1216, 2009 (in Chinese). 
78 Rehbinder, n. 12 above. 
79 See Rules for the Supervision over Civil Proceedings by the People’s Procuratorates (for Trial Implementation), 
Procuratorial Committee of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, 23 Sept. 2013 (in Chinese). 
80 Ke, n. 71, above. 
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While the risks of procuratorates overshadowing NGOs and civil society in China are 
clear, comparisons with other legal systems indicate that this type of system can operate 
successfully. In the US, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can refer cases to 
the Department of Justice (DoJ) in order for the DoJ to enforce legislation in the federal 
courts. However, a critical distinction is that while the EPA does have these referral 
powers, the ‘majority of cases [it] brings are still dealt with in the administrative 
forum’.81 Further distinguishing the US from China is the role of NGOs and civil 
society generally. In the US the private enforcement of environmental law through 
citizen suits is a response to the fact that federal agencies are reluctant to effectively 
make use of the legal remedies available for damage done to the environment. 82 
Consequently, US citizen suits initiated by members of civil society act to supplement 
public enforcement in a way that is in direct contrast to Chinese public interest litigation 
initiated by procuratorates. Such a comparison is valuable because China may be able 
to look towards the US as a model for reform. 
 
However, any such reforms adopted by China from the US would necessitate 
surrendering space to civil society in the enforcement of environmental legislation. 
Such a requirement may hinder any reform efforts as policymakers in China may well 
be reluctant to cede power to NGOs and civil society. One reason for this is that, 
compared to NGOs, procuratorates are considered to be better positioned to initiate 
                                                 
81 T. F. P. Sullivan, Environmental Law Handbook (Bernan Press, 2014), p. 96. Only in instances where the EPA 
seeks recovery of response costs or enforcement of an administrative order must it refer the case to the Department 
of Justice. 
82 W. Naysnerski & T. Tietenberg, ‘Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law’ (1992) 68(1) Land 
Economics pp. 28-48, at 42. 
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environmental litigation. Such reasoning is problematically self-fulfilling: NGOs in 
China will be unable to develop and become effective litigants due to being 
overshadowed by procuratorates, thus further entrenching the procuratorates’ role.83 
Moreover, this reasoning does not address the lack of effective mechanisms to hold 
procuratorates to account for how they enforce environmental regulations via litigation. 
The unwillingness to foster NGO involvement not only limits the scope for public 
interest litigation under existing Chinese law, but stifles reform initiatives as well. 
 
5. STANDING OF NGOS 
NGOs in China have gone through significant changes over the last two decades. First 
appearing in 1994,84 it was not until 2003 that the activities of Chinese environmental 
NGOs made an impact on both the public and the state.85 The role of environmental 
NGOs in China in highlighting the environmental effects of China’s economic policies 
is significant, not only for their positive impact on environmental policy but because it 
contradicts the popular assumption that NGOs had no role in China’s socialist 
government.86 Notwithstanding this however, there is evidence that China’s political 
system has resulted in NGOs facing unique legal issues in initiating public interest 
litigation when compared to other jurisdictions.  
 
                                                 
83 See Communique of the 4th Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of Communist Party of China (2 
Dec. 2014). Available at: http://www.china.org.cn/china/fourth_plenary_session/2014-
12/02/content_34208801.htm. 
84 J. Schwartz, ‘Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits’ (2004) 77(1) Pacific Affairs, pp. 28-49, at 36. 
85 Y. Aikawa, Environmental Policy and Governance in China (2017, Springer), p. 184. 
86 Ibid., p. 178. 
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While environmental NGOs have had a positive impact on environmental awareness in 
China, 87  some academics have argued that NGOs are merely ‘self-appointed 
guardians’ of the public interest.88 These arguments are based on traditional public law 
theories regarding legitimacy in representative democracy: because environmental 
NGOs are not elected they lack the democratic legitimacy to participate in 
environmental governance. This argument, however, has weakened as the values of 
deliberative democracy shape the expectations citizens have of the state and its 
emanations. Indeed, deliberative democracy and civil society can act as advocates for 
individuals or groups who are not adequately represented by representative democracy 
and lack other outlets to participate.89 Hence, although NGOs may fall short of being 
democratically representative, they do serve as advocates for groups who are denied 
standing under legal systems based on the protection of individual rights. Standing of 
NGOs in public interest litigation is considered as a valuable tool to hold administrative 
authorities to account in environmental matters. Further, as reflected in Germany, 
concerns over the lack of democratic legitimacy of NGOs can be partly resolved by 
ensuring open membership and granting NGO members full voting rights.90  
 
Another concern is that China does not have a strong enough civil society to enforce 
environmental laws through public interest litigation initiated by NGOs. In terms of 
environmental governance, Chinese civil society is the weakest pillar of China’s 
                                                 
87 See generally ibid.,. 
88 Rehbinder, n. 12 above. 
89 See generally H. Landemore, ‘Deliberative Democracy as Open, Not (Just) Representative Democracy’ (2017) 
146(3) Daedalus pp. 51-63. 
90 Rehbinder n. 12 above. 
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political environment. Chinese civil society is significantly weaker than its German 
counterpart, where a mature civil society and active NGOs have substantially 
contributed to the development and success of association suits. This has led to 
academics such as Chen to favour empowering procuratorates to initiate environmental 
litigation in the public interest.91 However, such arguments fail to appreciate the degree 
to which civil society is already acting within the space granted to it and the effect that 
the actions of NGOs are having on environmental decision-making processes. 92 
Examples of civil society acting on behalf of the public interest in China include 
campaigns to protect the Tibetan antelope93 and, notably, influencing the revision of 
the Environmental Protection Law 2014.94 The current political environment may have 
minimized the effectiveness of NGO interventions, but this does not undermine their 
potential value. 
 
The current legal framework granting NGOs standing in environmental litigation is 
complex, provided by various pieces of legislation. Under Article 55(1) of the Civil 
Procedure Law, standing is granted to ‘relevant organizations and authorities prescribed 
by law’. However, this provision is not explicit on whether standing of environmental 
NGOs should be subject to certain threshold requirements. This ambiguity has led to 
divergent judicial interpretations, with some courts declining to grant standing because 
                                                 
91 Chen, n. 73 above. 
92 J. Thibaut, ‘An Environmental Civil Society in China? Bridging Theoretical Gaps Through a Case Study of 
Environmental Protest’ (2017) 42(1-2) Internationales Asienforum pp. 135-63, at 157. 
93 C. Chang, 20 Years of China’s Public Voice (2012). Available at: 
https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4994-2-years-of-China-s-public-voice. 
94 X. Yang, China’s Green NGOs Fight for the Right to Sue (2013). Available at: 
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they do not view the NGO as an environmental NGO95 and other courts granting 
standing where the NGO was ‘relevant’ to environmental protection and it was legally 
registered.96 
 
While many academics favoured such a liberal interpretation of the rules on standing,97 
it contradicts the legislative intention of the Civil Procedure Law to impose restrictions 
in order to prevent vexatious litigation whilst not reducing the opportunities of 
competent NGOs to sue.98 The resulting uncertainty was remedied by the revisions 
made to the Environmental Protection Law in 2014, which set out three requirements 
that NGOs need to meet in order to be granted standing. Under the Environmental 
Protection Law, NGOs must be registered with the state at the municipal level or above 
in accordance with law. They must also be specialized in environmental protection 
public interest activities and have no record of administrative or punitive penalties for 
their activities in the past five consecutive years.99 Further, the organization’s charter 
must state that its aim is predominantly concerned with promoting the public interest.100 
 
                                                 
95 See J. Qie, The First Environmental Public Interest Litigation Case after the Revised Civil Procedure Law 
Entered into Force Was Stuck in an Awkward Situation (26 Mar, 2013). Available at: 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/2013-03/26/content_4313129.htm?node=5955 (in Chinese). 
96 Taizhou Environmental Protection Federation v. Jiangsu Chang Long Agrochemical Co., Ltd. et al., 
Intermediate Court of Taizhou, Environmental Public Interest Litigation, First Instance, No.00001, 10 Sept.2014 
(in Chinese); Taizhou Environmental Protection Federation v. Jiangsu Chang Long Agrochemical Co., Ltd. et al., 
High Court of Jiangsu, Environmental Public Interest Litigation, Appeal, No.00001, 30 Dec. 2014 (in Chinese).  
97 See, e.g., Z. Cui & L. Kong, Why The Number of Environmental Public Interest Litigation Cases Did Not 
Skyrocket (27 Nov. 2015). Available at: http:m.weekly.caixin.com/m/2015-11-27/100878973_all.html (in Chinese). 
98 C. Xin, Understanding the Environmental Protection Law of People’s Republic of China (Law Press China, 
2014), pp. 202-3 (in Chinese) and Law Committee of the National People’s Congress, The Report on the 
Modification of the Draft Amendment of Civil Procedure Law (24 Apr. 2012). Available at: 
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99 Environmental Protection Law, National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Order No. 9, 24 Apr. 2014 (in 
Chinese) art. 58. Additionally, organizations which initiate public interest litigation may not seek any economic 
benefits. 
100 Judicial Interpretation on Environmental Public Interest Litigation, n. 70 above, arts. 2-5. 
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While these requirements have been accepted and implemented in China, the legislative 
process in implementing these reforms was fraught. During the second draft of the 
Environmental Protection Law, the legislature wanted to restrict standing to a single 
established NGO,101 in clear violation of the ‘objective legality’ model. Moreover, the 
initial registration requirements for NGOs excluded local NGOs from being granted 
standing, which would have further limited the ability of environmental NGOs to hold 
the state to account. While the current Environmental Protection Law’s requirements 
for NGOs to be granted standing is less restrictive, the draft Environmental Protection 
Law is important because indicates the unease of the state with ceding power to NGOs 
and civil society. Further, the controversies during the drafting process may explain 
residual obstacles to NGOs’ standing in environmental litigation. 
 
The most significant obstacle impeding NGOs’ standing to initiate public interest 
litigation is the registry system. Not only does an NGO need to be registered at the Civil 
Affairs Department, but the operations of the NGO need to be supervised by another 
public authority in order for it to qualify for registration.102 In practice, the latter 
requirement is often very difficult to meet. Administrative authorities usually lack the 
incentives to take on such a supervisory responsibility and they do not trust grassroots 
organizations. Further, even if an NGO managed to find a supervisory authority, the 
                                                 
101 This is significant as the All-China Environment Federation is a ‘de facto government-owned organization’ 
subjugated to the Ministry of Environmental Protection. See J. Wübbeke, The Three-year Battle for China’s New 
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relationship can be easily terminated unilaterally by the authority. Under such 
circumstances, a large number of NGOs are unable to get registered, which creates not 
just legal and political risks, but also makes it difficult for NGOs to establish credibility, 
engage in fund raising and recruit better trained personnel. This is particularly true for 
advocacy groups, support for which is often considered by authorities to be too 
politically sensitive.103  
 
Another issue which hinders the ability of NGOs to initiate environmental public 
interest litigation is the requirement that NGOs be predominantly engaged with 
promoting the public interest. This is surprising because, on the surface, this 
requirement appears to be more relaxed than corresponding conditions in other 
jurisdictions. Indeed, a literal interpretation of China’s charter requirements allows 
NGOs to initiate environmental public interest litigation even if they are only partially 
engaged in environmental protection activities.104 This is in stark contrast to Germany, 
where only NGOs that are predominantly and not temporarily engaged with 
environmental protection are granted standing in environmental association suits. 
 
However, while the reforms introduced by the Environmental Protection Law seek to 
enable Chinese environmental NGOs to initiate public interest litigation, these reforms 
have not achieved the desired results. One reason for this is the onerous conditions 
                                                 
103 This is not necessarily the case for all NGOs, such as environmental science institutes: see All-China 
Environment Federation, 2008 Report on the Development of Environmental NGOs in China (26 May 2009). 
Available at: http://www.acef.com.cn/news/lhhdt/2009/0526/9394.html (in Chinese). 
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imposed by the Environmental Protection Law itself. The Law states that environmental 
NGOs must be registered for five years before being granted standing,105 which is 
significantly longer than the three year requirement implemented in Germany. 106 
Further, this longer time-period has a bigger impact in China because Chinese civil 
society is less developed than its Western counterparts. This is evidenced in an 
academic analysis by He, which indicates that only a minority of grassroots NGOs can 
survive for the required five years.107  
 
Larger and more renowned environmental NGOs can also be inhibited by the 
requirements set by the Environmental Protection Law. Friends of Nature, one of the 
first environmental NGOs in China,108 was challenged on its standing to initiate public 
interest litigation.109 Although Friends of Nature was registered as a branch of the 
International Academy of Chinese Culture in 1993, the environmental NGO did not 
independently register with the state as an environmental NGO until 18 June 2010.110 
It is on these grounds that the defendants argued that Friends of Nature failed to meet 
the five-year existence standard at the time of filing the lawsuit in question (1 January 
2015).111 The court ruled that Friends of Nature did have the standing to initiate the 
litigation in the public interest, justifying its decision on the basis that the NGO had 
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107 Z. He, Should Environmental Public Interest Litigation Find a New Path? (19 December 2014). Available at: 
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been previously engaged with environmental protection activities for more than five 
years.112 
 
Although this judgment was welcomed for enabling Friends of Nature, a well-
established NGO,113  to initiate environmental public interest litigation, the court’s 
interpretation of Article 58 is questionable. According to Article 19 of the Regulations 
on Registration and Administration of Social Organizations (1998), which applies to 
non-profit organizations, a branch office of a social organization does not possess a 
legal personality and should operate within the scope of authorization by the social 
organization. As such, Friends of Nature did not exist as a distinct legal entity until its 
official registration and any environmental activities it conducted should be attributed 
to the International Academy of Chinese Culture. This is not to criticize the court for 
making this decision. Rather, this example illustrates the difficulties faced by 
environmental NGO in complying with the Environmental Protection Law and further 
developing the role of civil society in China. 
 
Further issues can be identified in the Environmental Protection Law’s requirement for 
the NGO to have no record of any administrative or punitive penalties for its activities 
in the past five consecutive years. As currently formulated, any administrative or 
punitive penalty is sufficient to bar environmental NGOs from initiating public interest 
                                                 
112 Ibid. 
113 Friends of Nature has brought 8 out of 37 public interest litigation cases in China in 2015. See S. Wang, 
‘Observation Report on Environmental Public Interest Litigation’ in Dun Li (ed.), 2015 Observation Report on 
Environmental Public Interest Litigation (Law Press, 2015), pp. 251-82, at 263 (in Chinese). 
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litigation: the nature and severity of the conduct giving rise to the penalty is irrelevant. 
In practice, this can lead to NGOs losing their ability to initiate public interest litigation 
over minor violations of administrative law that are not connected to the professional 
standing of the NGO in question.114 This is problematic, as this requirement can be 
used to control NGOs that challenge public authorities and their actions. It is interesting 
to note that this issue is unique to China,115 further highlighting the tensions between 
the state and the developing role of civil society in China.   
 
Finally, under the Environmental Protection Law NGOs that are registered at the county 
level116 do not have standing to initiate environmental public interest litigation. This is 
problematic as it excludes the majority of environmental NGOs in China from initiating 
public interest litigation. Indeed, by 2009 over 60% of registered NGOs were registered 
at the county level.117 It is important to note that the level at which NGOs register in 
China is not based on the merit of the work conducted by the NGO, but rather on the 
geographical scope of the NGO’s activities. In fact, local environmental NGOs may be 
better suited to initiating public interest litigation in some instances because they may 
be more familiar with the issues being contested.  While larger environmental NGOs, 
such as Friends of Nature, cooperate with local NGOs,118  this is not a sufficient 
substitute for county NGOs to initiate public interest litigation by themselves. By 
                                                 
114 E.g. the violation of fire safety regulations. 
115 Rehbinder, n. 12 above. 
116 In 2015 there were 2209 counties in China: see generally M. Li, B. He, R. Guo, Y. Li, Y. Chen and Y. Fan, 
“Study on Population Distribution Pattern at the County Level of China” (2018) 10(10) Sustainability 3598-1614.  
117 X. Huang, Report on Chinese NGOs (2010-2011) (Social Sciences Academic Press, 2011), p. 5 (in Chinese). 
118 Either by allowing the local NGO to participate as co-plaintiffs or contribute by dealing with local matters like 
gathering information and evidence. See F. Ge, ‘A Practical Perspective on Environmental Public Interest 
Litigation’. Speech delivered at Environmental and Resources Law Institute, 3 June 2017. 
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excluding country NGOs from initiating public interest litigation it is unlikely that civil 
society in China will develop, further risking and undermining the effective 
enforcement of environmental regulations.  
 
In analyzing China’s attempts to grant environmental NGOs standing, the restrictive 
approach taken by the state is notable when contrasted against the expanded standing 
of administrative authorities and procuratorates. This is particularly prominent when 
the negative impact of this expansion on the ability of environmental NGOs to initiate 
environmental public interest litigation is taken into account. As such, in attempting to 
shift towards the ‘objective legality’ model of public interest litigation, China has failed 
to empower the groups most capable of safeguarding the norms set by environmental 
laws: environmental NGOs. To remedy this, China should focus on cultivating and 
enabling a culture that promotes the development of NGOs and strengthens their 
capacity to help enforce environmental law through public interest litigation. By doing 
so, China’s shift towards adopting the ‘objective legality’ model would become more 
coherent and would help to improve the enforcement of environmental legislation and 
regulations in China. 
  
6. CONCLUSIONS  
 
China is in the process of transitioning its approach to environmental litigation to a 
strategy based on the ‘objective legality’ model. By adopting such a model, China is 
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seeking to improve the enforcement of environmental law along the lines of 
jurisdictions such as Germany and the US. A critical element of the ‘objective legality’ 
model is the relaxation of the rules establishing standing in environmental public 
interest litigation. Intended to accommodate the increased focus on legal norms that is 
inherent to the ‘objective legality’ model, China has undergone various legal reforms 
to grant standing to administrative authorities, procuratorates and environmental NGOs.  
 
However, these reforms have not successfully incorporated the ‘objective legality’ 
model into China’s enforcement of environmental regulations. While this article has 
identified various issues with China’s legal reforms, the dominant issue which 
overshadows the shift towards the ‘objective legality’ model is the restrictions placed 
on civil society to initiate environmental public interest litigation. By erecting 
procedural barriers for environmental NGOs to initiate such litigation and by expanding 
the powers of administrative authorities and procuratorates, China has reduced the 
power of civil society, contrary to the underlying principles of the ‘objective legality’ 
model. In this way, while China’s reforms are intended to empower civil society they 
actually weaken it, hindering its effectiveness at enforcing environmental legislation 
and undermining the shift towards the ‘objective legality’ model. 
 
To remedy this fundamental issue, China should revoke the standing it has granted 
administrative authorities and procuratorates to enforce environmental law via public 
interest litigation. Further, in order to enable civil society to fill the gap in enforcement 
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left by these bodies, the state should also relax the requirements for granting standing 
to environmental NGOs to initiate public interest litigation. By facilitating civil society 
participation in this way, China is more likely to successfully shift its approach to 
enforcing environmental law to the ‘objective legality’ model and improve how 
environmental laws are enforced. However, such developments require the state to cede 
powers to civil society and NGOs. While this is something that the state has been 
traditionally reluctant to do, it is a necessary step in order to effectively incorporate the 
‘objective legality’ model into its environmental law. If the state is unable to cede power 
and allow civil society to develop, it risks further undermining the role of civil society 
in China to the detriment of the public interest and the environment itself. 
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